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A novel model-based fault detection and diagnosis method is proposed that is based on following event sequences mea-
sured in a discrete dynamic process. The model of the nominal and faulty operation modes is given in the form of event
sequences, that are decomposed according to the components and sub-components present in the process system. The faulty
event sequences are defined using extended procedure HAZID tables. A diagnostic algorithm is also presented that uses a
component-wise decomposed form of the event sequences. The operation of the algorithm is illustrated on a simple example
of a process system consisting of three similar tanks.
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Introduction
Fault prevention and mitigation in the field of process
system management is a task of crucial importance in
avoiding serious accidents. Thus, numerous hazard iden-
tification (HAZID) techniques have been developed in
the past decades to ensure the safe operation of process
systems and to relieve effects of faults (see [1] for a
broad presentation of the field). Among these techniques,
the most important methodologies involve the function-
driven HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability, see [2]) anal-
ysis and the component-driven FMEA (Fault Mode and
Effects Analysis). There have been results in the past
decade for automating the creation of HAZOP analysis
([3] with a concrete application described in [4]). Blend-
ing the component-driven and function-driven analyses
also resulted in a novel hazard identification approach de-
scribed in [5].
Although the information collected in the HAZOP
and FMEA studies serve the purpose of hazard identifi-
cation, these studies can be the basis of diagnostic pro-
cedures, too. A model-based diagnostic method based on
HAZOP and FMEA information is reported in [6].
It is important to note that the above techniques con-
centrate on the static case when the deviation from a nor-
mal steady-state behaviour is of importance. Therefore,
the transient case when the plant is controlled by an op-
erational procedure is not addressed in these results. A
recent study [7] tries to deal with the diagnostic task by
using a specially constructed P-HAZID analysis and a
diagnostic algorithm. In this paper, this diagnostic idea
is extended to be able to handle more complex diagnos-
tic tasks - by taking advantage of a possible decomposi-
tion of typical process systems along their similar com-
ponents.
Basic notions
In a complex system the full dynamic model that de-
scribes its behaviour under normal and faulty operation
models is rarely available, therefore one should base the
diagnosis on qualitative information both in terms of
the dynamic models and in the measured data. Here we
briefly summarize the basic notions for qualitative model
based diagnosis.
Qualitative range spaces
Current values of continuous measurable outputs in pro-
cess systems can be described using a properly selected
qualitative range space. For example, to describe the
value of a level sensor in a tank, the following range space
can be used:
Qe = {e−, 0, L,N,H, e+}. (1)
Here, 0 means an empty tank, L, N and H means low,
normal and high fluid level, respectively, while e− and
e+ refer to unmeasurably low and high fluid levels (this
might mean a failure in the level sensor itself). This range
space will be used to describe system outputs during op-
eration.
Input-output event sequences
Operational procedures in process systems are detailed
list of instructions for the plant operator personnel to
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perform certain operations on the plant. Procedures can
be formally described using finite input-output event se-
quences where a single event describes a change in ei-
ther the inputs or the outputs of the system at a specific
time instant. Therefore the syntax of a single input-output
event (at time instant t) is the following
eventt = (t; input values; output values).
The input in an event always refers to a state of an actua-
tor component in the process system (e.g., in the case of
a valve it can be open (op) or closed (cl)). On the other
hand, the output in an event refers to a value of an output
of the process system in the qualitative range space using
the qualitative set defined in Eq. (1). Sequences formed
from these events are called traces and defined as
T (t1, tn) = eventt1 , ..., eventtn .
Separate events in a trace contain the same inputs and
outputs. Note that the discrete event time instances ti are
abbreviated by their indexes i in the description, i.e. 2
stands for t2.
Examples of single events for a two-input single out-
put case include
(1; cl, op;N) , (2; cl, op; L)
where at time instances t1 and t2 the two valve inputs
are held closed and open, respectively, while the level de-
creases form its normal value to the low level. The trace
formed form the above two consecutive events is written
as
T (1, 2) = ((1; cl, op;N), (2; cl, op; L)) .
For every operational procedure there exists a trace
(called the nominal trace) which describes its behaviour
under fault-free conditions. The diagnostic method com-
pares this trace to other traces which may have been
executed under faulty conditions (called characteristic
traces), and the differences (called deviations) are later
used to find possible malfunctions of components in the
system.
Deviations
Nominal and characteristic traces can be compared by
comparing their corresponding event fragments. The dif-
ference between two corresponding event fragments is
described by a deviation. Deviations are formed from a
deviation guideword and the nominal event from which
the corresponding characteristic trace event is deviating
from. The following deviation types are used during di-
agnosis:
• never-happened: When the particular event never
happened in the characteristic trace.
• later: When the event happened in the characteristic
trace, but at a later time instant.
• earlier: When the event happened in the character-
istic trace, but at an earlier time instant.
• greater: When a particular output’s qualitative value
was higher in the characteristic event than that of the
nominal trace.
• smaller: When a particular output’s qualitative
value was lower in the characteristic event than that
of the nominal trace.
For the detailed description of the greater and smaller
qualitative relations, please refer to [7].
Procedure HAZID
As a combination and extension of the widely used
FMEA and HAZOP analyses (for details, refer to [7] or
[1], and in particular to [5]), the procedure HAZID (ab-
breviated as P-HAZID) analysis can be used for fault di-
agnosis during operational procedures in a given process
system. The result of this P-HAZID analysis is given in
the form of a spreadsheet and it consists of deviations to-
gether with their implications and possible (root) causes.
A cause is considered to be a root cause if it is a non-
measurable failure mode of a system component (which
is an elementary part of the system). For example, a leak
on a tank is considered as a root cause. A simple example
of a P-HAZID table can be found in Table 1.
Using the initial set of differences (deviations) be-
tween the characteristic trace and the nominal trace, the
set of possible root causes can be found using simple rea-
soning. For details, refer to Ref. [7].
The diagnostic algorithm uses this technique first to
find possible P-HAZID row(s) to start from (using the
set of initial deviations). Then, following the deviation
chains defined by these rows, the algorithm proceeds to-
wards a possible root cause by traversing new rows based
on the initial set of deviations. Using this procedure, it
may end up at a root cause or at a row with deviations
from which it cannot proceed forward, because they are
not contained in the initial set of deviations. The algo-
rithm assumes that the root causes are static and they hap-
pened before the execution of the procedure began.
Component based diagnosis
It is widely known that complex systems can often be
decomposed in a hierarchical way using simple non-
dividable elements that are called components. The con-
nection of these components is usually specified in terms
of a graph called flowsheet. Such a decomposition can
be used effectively for the operation of a reasoning-based
diagnostic algorithm.
Component based structural decomposition
The above mentioned fault diagnosis based on the P-
HAZID analysis is only developed for process systems
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Table 1: A simple example of a P-HAZID table.
Inputs: op=open, cl=closed. Outputs: 0=no, L=low,
N=normal. Deviations: NH=never-happened,
LAT=later, EAR=eariler, SML=smaller and
GRE=greater. Faults: TANK-LEAK is the leak of
the tank and POS-BIAS is the positive bias failure of the
tank level sensor.
Cause Deviation Implication
TANK-LEAK NH(2;op,cl;L) NH(3;op,cl;N)
NH(2;op,cl;L) NH(3;op,cl;N) NH(4;op,op;N)
TANK-LEAK SML(2;op,cl;L) SML(3;op,cl;N)
SML(2;op,cl;L) SML(3;op,cl;N) SML(4;op,op;N)
POS-BIAS GRE(1;op,cl;0) GRE(2;op,cl;L)
GRE(1;op,cl;0) GRE(2;op,cl;L) GRE(3;op,cl;N)
GRE(2;op,cl;L) GRE(3;op,cl;N) NH(4;op,op;N)
POS-BIAS NH(1;op,cl;0) EAR(2;op,cl;L)
NH(1;op,cl;0) EAR(2;op,cl;L) EAR(3;op,cl;N)
consisting of different individual components in [7]; the
possible redundancy of such systems (e.g. multiple com-
ponents of the same characteristics) were not taken into
account. However, complex process systems in practice
can be decomposed into a connected network of more
simple components. For example, the process system in
Fig. 1 can be decomposed into three smaller similar com-
ponents each formed by an input and an output valve and
a tank.
When developing the decomposed form of a process
system it can happen that some elements are part of mul-
tiple subsystems as in the case of valves VB and VC in
Fig. 1. These elements are called boundary components,
and are assumed to be error-free during the diagnosis.
Traces affecting different components can also be de-
composed into a chain of trace fragments each referring
to a single component of the trace. Events in such a trace
fragment have only a subset of inputs and outputs of the
united trace (only the inputs and outputs of the particular
component that is present in them). Fragments also have
information about the next trace fragment (called the next
trace), and there is a starting condition (an event) that is
associated with them to help the diagnosis. Along with
the trace fragment, each component has its own associ-
ated P-HAZID spreadsheet.
The component based diagnostic algorithm
Applying the diagnostic approach described in [7] on
a decomposed process system, the components can be
diagnosed separately against faults, treating them as a
whole system during diagnosis. After the separate diag-
nosis, the root causes can be collected and the result-
ing set of root causes yields to the set of root causes in
the united system. Using the component decomposition,
the size of the HAZID information required can be made
lower in cases when similar connected subsystems form
the process system to be diagnosed. On the other hand,
VA
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Figure 1: Process system consisting of 3 similar tanks
system-level deviations need to be converted into compo-
nent deviations by aligning their time and reducing the in-
puts and outputs in their associated events to component-
level inputs and outputs.
The diagnosis is then performed by comparing the
whole nominal trace with the characteristic trace, and
then distributing the deviations (differences) among the
components. Before distributing, time alignment and re-
duction of input and output states to component level
are performed (including the component’s boundary el-
ements). After the distribution, component-level diagno-
sis may begin to explore possible (root) causes on the
component-level.
The diagnosis proceeds along the flow direction by
starting from the first component, takes the deviations,
generates the set of possible root causes from them, and
then tries to proceed to the next component by checking
the starting condition of the next trace fragment - if there
is any. If the start condition is fulfilled, the diagnosis con-
tinues, otherwise it halts. For example, in the case of Fig.
1 the second fragment might have a start condition con-
taining a statement about the minimum level of fluid in
tank TA, and in the case of the congestion of valve VA
no fluid is coming into a system, therefore, tank TA is not
even filling up to the specified minimum level. In this case
the diagnosis stops. The result of the diagnostic algorithm
is always the union of identified and non-identified root
causes created by the consecutive diagnostic algorithm
that runs on the components of the consequent nominal
trace fragments.
For reference, the whole diagnostic algorithm is pre-
sented as a pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
collects all root causes (sets INC and IRC) given a com-
ponent decomposition, a starting component, and a pos-
sibly faulty characteristic trace.
Case study
In the case study the diagnosis procedure for the sim-
ple process system in Fig. 1 containing three sequentially
connected tanks is used. The measured output of the tanks
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Algorithm 1 Component-based reasoning procedure
1: INC← {∅}
2: IRC← {∅}
3: actualComponent← startComponent
4: continue← true
5: shift← 0
6: while continue do
7: DEV← GENERATEDEVIATIONS(actualComponent, chrTrace, shift)
8: FDP← COLLECTFINALDEVIATIONPAIRS(DEV)
9: for all pair ∈ FDP do
10: startDeviation← proj1(pair)
11: startImplication← proj2(pair)
12: REASON(startDeviation, startImplication, actualComponent.phazid)
13: end for
14: if actualComponent has successive component and its start condition evaluates to true then
15: shift← length(actualComponent.trace)− 1 + shift
16: actualComponent← GETCOMPONENT(actualComponent.successiveComponent)
17: else
18: continue← false
19: end if
20: end while
21: function GENERATEDEVIATIONS(component, chrTrace, shift)
22: DEV← {∅}
23: nomTrace← component.trace
24: reducedTrace← TRIMTRACE(chrTrace, shift, shift+ component.trace.length)
25: locChrTrace← CONVERTTOCOMPONENTLEVEL(reducedTrace)
26: for T := 1 to length(nomTrace) do
27: for all deviation D of locChrTrace from nomTrace at time T do
28: DEV← DEV⋃(D)
29: end for
30: end for
31: returnDEV
32: end function
33: procedure REASON(deviation, implication, phazid)
34: if ∃R ∈ ROWS(phazid), deviation = devphazid(R), implication = impphazid(R) then
35: for all {R, devphazid(R) = deviation and impphazid(R) = implication} do
36: if causephazid(R) ∈ RC then
37: IRC← IRC⋃ causephazid(R)
38: return
39: else if causephazid(R) ∈ DEV and causephazid(R) ≺ devphazid(R) inDEV then
40: REASON(causephazid(R), devphazid(R), phazid)
41: else
42: INC← INC⋃ causephazid(R)
43: return
44: end if
45: end for
46: else
47: INC← INC⋃ causephazid(R)
48: return
49: end if
50: end procedure
63
Table 2: Tank fill operational procedure.
Time Input values Output values
VA VB VC VD TA TB TC
1 op cl cl cl 0 0 0
2 op cl cl cl L 0 0
3 op op cl cl N 0 0
4 op op cl cl N L 0
5 op op op cl N N 0
6 op op op cl N N L
7 op op op op N N N
Table 3: Normal fill in a single tank with no faults.
Input valve Output Valve Tank Level
op cl 0
op cl L
op op N
is the tank level that takes its values from Qe in Eq. (1),
and the input variables are the valve positions (open (op)
or closed (cl)).
Components, operational procedure, and nominal trace
Every tank may contain no fluid (the tank level is equal
to no (0)), may be low on fluid (level value is low (L)), or
might have normal fluid level (level value is normal (N)).
In every time instant the level increases by one qualitative
magnitude (i.e. from no to low or from low to normal)
if fluid is coming through the input valve but the output
valve is closed. Due to the same size of the valves the
effect of fluid flow out of the system is similar, but in the
opposite direction (from normal to low or from low to
no). The valve positions (open (op) or closed (cl)) can be
changed by the operator; they are considered as inputs of
the system. Leak in the tank is assumed to be equal to the
size of an open valve (i.e. a quite substantial leak).
The considered operational procedure is the initial
filling of all the three tanks with fluid (the fill operational
procedure in short), and is described in detail in Table 2.
The process system can be decomposed into three
components, therefore the fill operational procedure can
also be partitioned into three identical procedure frag-
ments along the component boundaries (the VB and VC
valves).
The fragment abstracted from the three identical trace
fragments associated to the three tanks can be observed in
Table 3. It has only the subset of inputs and outputs which
are directly related to the particular tank component - the
input and output valve and the tank level.
The corresponding component P-HAZID table can be
found in Table 4 with some of the component faults and
deviations associated to them. Instances of this P-HAZID
table are used in the case of all three tanks during diag-
nosis.
Table 4: P-HAZID table of a single tank component
with two valves for a reference trace of Table 3. Faults:
TANK-LEAK is leak of the tank, POS-BIAS is the pos-
itive bias fault of the level sensor and NEG-BIAS is the
negative bias failure of the level sensor.
Cause Deviation Implication
TANK-LEAK NH(2;op,cl;L) NH(3;op,op;N)
TANK-LEAK SML(2;op,cl,L) SML(3;op,op;N)
NEG-BIAS LAT(1;op,cl;0) NH(2;op,cl;L)
LAT(1;op,cl;0) NH(2;op,cl;L) NH(3;op,op;N)
NEG-BIAS SML(1;op,cl;0) SML(2;op,cl;L)
SML(1;op,cl;0) SML(2;op,cl;L) SML(3;op,op;N)
POS-BIAS NH(1;op,cl;0) EAR(2;op,cl;L)
NH(1;op,cl;0) EAR(2;op,cl;L) NH(3;op,op;N)
POS-BIAS GRE(1;op,cl;0) GRE(2;op,cl;L)
GRE(1;op,cl;0) GRE(2;op,cl;L) GRE(3;op,op;N)
Table 5: Tank fill operational procedure with a leak in the
second tank TB. The leak caused two different events in
the operational procedure related to TB (in bold), these
differences resulted in the four deviations the diagnosis
could start from.
Time Input values Output values
VA VB VC VD TA TB TC
1 op cl cl cl 0 0 0
2 op cl cl cl L 0 0
3 op op cl cl N 0 0
4 op op cl cl N 0 0
5 op op op cl N 0 0
6 op op op cl N 0 0
7 op op op op N 0 0
The operation of the diagnostic algorithm
The operation of the diagnostic algorithm is illustrated
with the case when a rupture of the second tank is present
as a root case (fault).
A characteristic trace with the leak of the second tank
can be seen in Table 5. The size of the leak is assumed to
be larger or equal to the size of an outbound pipe, there-
fore, the tank cannot fill up and no fluid can flow to the
third tank TC.
The starting condition of the TB and TC tank compo-
nents is the appropriate “normal” level in the preceding
tank. In that way it is ensured that diagnosis is done on
the operational components only.
The diagnosis of this faulty scenario begins by start-
ing with the first tank component TA. There are no differ-
ences (and therefore no deviations) regarding this com-
ponent. The start condition of the second component is
fulfilled, therefore, the diagnosis moves towards the next
component TB.
However, in the case of TB the following deviations
are found after comparing the nominal and characteristic
traces (due to that two consequent events did not hap-
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pened, instead, two events happened with lower output
values at time instant 4 and 5 in the operational proce-
dure):
• never-happened(4;open,closed;low)
• never-happened(5;open,open;normal)
• smaller(4;open,closed;low)
• smaller(5;open,open;normal)
The time instant of the deviations are shifted back by 2
units because the second component’s first event happens
at the third system-level time instant. After that, the diag-
nosis is initiated on the HAZID table. Searching for the
already found deviations and connecting them to possible
root causes (as in the case of the original diagnostic idea
in [7]) the leak of the second tank can be found.
Because of the lack of fluid in the second tank, the
start condition of the third component is not fulfilled,
therefore, the diagnostic process halts at this step result-
ing in a single possible root cause being the TANK-
LEAK.
Conclusions
A novel component based extension of the single compo-
nent diagnostic algorithm presented in [7] is described in
this paper. Using the extension, the domain of application
can be extended to more complex composite process sys-
tems. Driven by the decomposition of the overall system
into components, the P-HAZID tables used for diagnosis
are processed at component level by the diagnostic algo-
rithm. The extended method is efficient in the cases when
the overall process system consists of similar small com-
ponents.
The component-based diagnostic procedure was de-
scribed on a formal level, along with its proposed pseudo-
code. A case study for a process system of multiple com-
ponents and a simple failure was also provided.
The following improvements are planned to extend
the component-based diagnostic approach:
• The procedure is based on the assumption that the
boundary elements between different components
are free of failures. As a future work, this limitation
might be removed by using a higher level reasoning
above the components (as in the form of a system-
level HAZID table, for example).
• At the moment, the algorithm is only working for al-
ready coded static event information in order to find
faults in the system. Diagnosis would be more valu-
able if events could be processed dynamically, thus
the diagnostic procedure could be executed real-
time along with the operational procedures.
• Diagnosis would be more accurate if the derivatives
of internal states (e.g. the derivative of the tank level)
were present in the events.
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